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BALANCING SECURITY AND ACCESS IN THE NATION'S
CAPITAL: MANAGING FEDERAL SECURITY-RELATED
STREET CLOSURES AND TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DC Appleseed Center for Law and Justice*
NOTE FROM THE EDITOR:

This report was prepared in December 2003 in order to stimulate a dialogue
on the role the District of Columbia government should play with the federal
government in attempting to achieve an appropriate balance between physical
security and open access to public space when deciding on traffic restrictions
around or near federal buildings or federal sites in the District of Columbia. A
summary of this report was presented at the UDC/DCSL Law Review November
2003 symposium "In the Aftermath of September 11: Defending Civil liberties in
the Nation's Capital." Since this report was prepared there has been an ebb and
flow of traffic restrictions imposed and rescinded at various times in line with
varying security concerns, usually with little prior consultation with the District
government. This report is presented here largely as it was written in December
2003, without attempting to update it to reflect subsequent developments. While
the details of the restrictions may change from day to day, the basic concerns
outlined in the report and the recommendations for improving coordination between the federal and District governments are still relevant today.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The appropriate balance between physical security and open access to public
space is elusive in this post-September 11th world. This paper is designed to facilitate discussion of the role the District of Columbia government should play with
the federal government in attempting to achieve an appropriate balance when
deciding on traffic restrictions around or near federal buildings or federal sites in
the District of Columbia. The paper examines the history of federal road closures
and traffic restrictions in the District, noting current key restrictions and the
groups and taskforces that have been convened to discuss, implement, and/or
make sense of those restrictions. The paper then analyzes the question of the
District's proper role in the federal security-related decision making process.
The paper concludes that if the District were involved in the process the way it
should be, some suggested restrictions either would not be made or would be
made differently. Other restrictions, if they were implemented, could be implemented more effectively.
The paper recommends:
1. The complex web of interjurisdictional agreements related to security
street closure and traffic restriction issues should be formalized and
clarified;
2. A joint federal-District group should be established to evaluate security
concerns and weigh the costs of diminishing freedom, access, mobility, and
convenience;
3. A mechanism should be established that allows for temporary emergency
street closings yet requires pre-approval for permanent street closings.
The paper explains why a collaborative, well-coordinated process would maximize safety, minimize disruption, and ensure effective response to any future perceived or real security threat.
II.

INTRODUCTION

During rush hour on the clear, cool morning of March 17, 2003, disgruntled
and discouraged fifty-year-old North Carolina tobacco farmer Dwight W. Watson
drove himself and his John Deere tractor to the nation's capital. Like so many
citizens before him, he came to Washington to protest. And like so many before
him, he chose the National Mall as his venue. 1 Shortly after arriving on the Mall,
Watson drove into a pond north and west of the Washington Monument and just
south of Constitution Avenue, and let it be known that he intended 2to blow himself up and whatever part of Washington, D.C., he could with him.
1 See David Nakamura & Allan Lengel, Tractor Driver in Standoff with Police on Mall; N.C.
Man Claims to Have Explosives, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at B1.
2 Id.
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The Mall is national park land, under the jurisdiction and control of the National Park Service (NPS). NPS Park Police officers arrived at the scene and
assumed control of the operation shortly after "Tractorman," as he was soon
dubbed by the media, made his violent intentions known. The Park Police were
joined by every major federal and local law enforcement agency in the city, including the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), swelling the ranks of law
enforcement officers on the scene to approximately two hundred.3 By the time
traffic management officials from the District's Department of Transportation
(D. Dot) were called to the scene, federal authorities had established a security
perimeter that included closing: Constitution Avenue between 15th Street and
23rd Street, N.W., north of the Mall; parts of Independence Avenue, S.W., south
of the Mall; and parts of Virginia Avenue, N.W., north of Constitution Avenue.
In addition, a portion of 17th Street, N.W., north of Constitution Avenue was
being used as a staging area for the police. Traffic was shut down in this very
wide area without any consultation with District traffic officials. Traffic was
brought to a standstill, not just in the area around the Mall, but in large portions
of the entire southern and western metropolitan region. 4
The Tractorman incident came at a time when the District, and indeed the
entire country, was at a heightened state of alert due to fears of terrorism-coming as it did on the eve of American military action in Iraq. The nation's "Terror
Alert Level" had recently been elevated to "Code Orange," the second highest in
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's five levels of alert. No one was in a
mood to take any chances with Tractorman, so law enforcement officials on the
scene gave him a wide berth and decided to wait him out. In the meantime, no
traffic moved near the western end of the Mall for three days.5
The traffic tie-ups during the Tractorman incident were exacerbated by the
federal closure and restrictions of traffic on key thoroughfares in the general area
of the Mall, including Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., and E Street, N.W., north and
south of the White House respectively. Those other closed roads, closed in the
wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, might otherwise have helped serve as
alternate routes around the Mall. But with them closed, there simply was no
place for traffic to go, especially in an east-west direction. 6
After three days, Tractorman gave himself up, and it turned out that he possessed no explosives. However, although he may not have had or used tangible
weapons, the fear, chaos, and disruption his stunt created arguably caused as
3

See Arlo Wagner, Standoff on the Mall Tests Patience of Police, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003,

at B1.

4 See Katherine Shaver, Mall Standoff Fuels Evacuation Fears; Traffic Tie-Ups Illustrate Road
System's Vulnerability, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2003, at B1.
5 See id.
6 See id.
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much psychological, financial, and emotional damage as any bomb could have.
The region suffered through several of the worst rush hours in the history of the
nation's capital. Trucks could not deliver their goods, ambulances could not get
through, and fingers pointed blame everywhere. People throughout the area
questioned aloud how, if one deranged man on a tractor could cause so7 much
trouble, what kind of trouble a band of dedicated terrorists could cause?
What if District traffic officials had been called in earlier? Could security concerns have been more carefully balanced against the need for public access? According to District officials, the answer is "yes." The District has access to scores
of mobile variable message boards, lighted signs that can inform motorists of
problems ahead and suggest alternate routes. The District controls the timing of
traffic lights throughout the city and District officials are in regular contact with
their counterparts in Maryland and Virginia who have access to similar tools to
manage traffic. And the District is in regular contact with public information
officers from all District agencies, who can get the word out to the public about
not just an immediate situation, but also appropriate alternative routes designed
and coordinated to facilitate traffic flow throughout the city. During the incident,
Independence Avenue was eventually reopened, as was Virginia Avenue. An
early careful balancing of the marginal safety improvements gained by closing
these two roads against the extreme difficulties caused by their closing (especially
in the greater context of all the other road closings) might have resulted in those
two roads not having been closed in the first place.
Accordingly, if District officials had been involved earlier, the traffic situation
would almost certainly have been eased somewhat. Due to the nature and duration of the Tractorman incident, traffic would have been tied up no matter what.
But greater coordination with the District would have facilitated the improvement of traffic conditions in the District and throughout the region.
This incident illustrates a larger issue in the District. Since September 11,
2001, the three branches of the federal government and their constituent agencies
have implemented numerous security-related changes that have profoundly impacted negatively on people's daily lives. In Washington, D.C., a major target of
terrorist threats, federal agencies have imposed restrictions on access to public
space and have exercised control over vehicular and pedestrian traffic by closing8
streets, limiting access to public buildings, and imposing parking restrictions.
Like the actions taken during the Tractorman incident, many of these restrictive
actions were abruptly taken without consultation or coordination with the District government. And although many of these other restrictions were once
viewed as temporary, most now appear to have become permanent.
7
8

See id. and infra note 70.
Current key closures and restrictions at http://www.dc.gov/closures.
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These restrictions, combined with earlier security restrictions imposed in the
District following the bombing of the Murrah Building, have had far-reaching
impact. Symbols of our democracy-such as the White House, the Capitol, and
Pennsylvania Avenue-have been adversely affected. Traffic congestion in the
heart of downtown Washington has intensified, adding up to forty-five minutes to
a cross-town trip. 9 This congestion has led to what traffic planners describe as
"failed corridors" and "failed intersections" on every street around the White
House.' 0 These traffic tie-ups have created more than just disruption, inefficiency, and inconvenience for commuters, businesspeople, residents, and shoppers; the tie-ups have created significant public safety problems. 1 Pedestrians
must negotiate a maze of barriers, some of which obscure the view of oncoming
traffic; drivers are forced to navigate detours and altered traffic patterns, as well
as concrete barriers adjacent to roadways. Perhaps most notably, street closures
and traffic tie-ups have a tremendous impact on overall mobility, affecting the
time it would take the general public to reach safe areas-or evacuate unsafe
areas-in the event of a genuine emergency.
In addition, the restrictions have had a significant economic impact. Local
businesses have reported that a combination of increased traffic from closed
roads and the limitations on truck movement have cost them time, efficiencies,
and money.' 2 And correspondingly, the restrictions have limited the ability of
residents, commuters, and visitors to move about the city. Taken together, the
restrictions imposed by the federal government have placed great strains and
costs on those who live in, work in, and visit Washington, D.C.
Federal government entities will and must make national security determinations. But any local security measure taken in response to national security de9 For example, Pennsylvania Avenue between 15th and 17th Streets, N.W., handled approximately 26,000 daily car trips at the time it was closed in 1995. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, NAT'L
CAPITAL PLANNING COMM'N (NCPC), PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TRAFFIC ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS,
at 1.1 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter NCPC PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TRAFFIC ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS].
E Street south of the White House handled approximately 12,000 daily car trips. See id. Now that
both Pennsylvania Avenue and E Street are closed, that traffic must be detoured to the surrounding
streets, which already were carrying a maximum load. See Emergency Preparednessin the Nation's
Capital: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Dist. of Columbia, Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th
Cong. (2001) (statement of Mayor Anthony Williams). See also BRUCE HOFFMAN ET AL., RAND,
SECURITY IN THE NATIONS CAPITAL AND THE CLOSURE OF PENNSYLVANIA

2 (2002) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
10 NCPC PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TRAFFIC

AVENUE:

AN ASSESS-

MENT

ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS,

supra note 9, at 5.2 &

5.3.

11 See also NCPC,

THE

NATIONAL

CAPITAL

URBAN

DESIGN AND

SECURITY

PLAN

10

(Oct. 2002) [hereinafter NCPC URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN] (noting that "improvements to
traffic flow also provide safety benefits related to faster emergency response time and evacuation
times, if and when necessary").
12 See Jon Ward, Truckless Day Goes Quietly on 17th Street, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at A8;
see also RAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
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terminations-including efforts to streamline the measure's effectiveness and
minimize the disruption and costs that these decisions impose-should be informed by the knowledge and timely input of District officials. Those officials
have a unique understanding and special expertise that should be utilized when,
based on national security considerations, federal officials propose street closings
and related restrictions on public access. If District officials had been consulted,
some proposed restrictions could be implemented differently or avoided altogether. A process that allows timely input by District officials would allow the
federal government to both make and implement more effective national security
decisions. A collaborative, well-coordinated process would maximize safety, minimize disruption, and ensure effective response to any future perceived or real
security threat. This report explains why this is so.
This report reviews the most significant federal pedestrian and vehicular security-related traffic restrictions imposed in the District during the past two decades,
examines the federal and local entities with authority over the subject matter, and
explains why the District should play a significant and collaborative role in these
activities. The report also presents a series of recommendations on how securityrelated traffic restrictions should be formulated in the future. We believe that
these recommendations will help further the goal of protecting the infrastructure
and personnel of the federal government in Washington, D.C., in a way that, to
the maximum extent possible, maintains the well-being and protects the free
movement of the District's citizenry, commuters, and visitors.
Ill.

METHODOLOGY

In the fall of 2002, the DC Appleseed Center for Law and Justice initiated this
project, requesting the assistance of a project team composed of members of the
DC Appleseed staff and Board of Directors and attorneys from the law firm of
Arnold & Porter LLP. The project was precipitated by the federal ban of truck
traffic and strict "no parking" enforcement on 17th Street, N.W., south of Pennsylvania Avenue, and also by a similar security-inspired ban on demonstrations
across the street from the White House in Lafayette Park. 13 The District was
offered no consultative role in these federal actions. It is now clear that systematic coordination between the federal and District governments would present an
opportunity for more effective implementation of road closings and related
actions.
13 The Council of the District of Columbia's Committee on the Judiciary, through public hearings and legislation, has addressed constitutional and civil rights issues associated with protests in the
District. See COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PUBLIC ROUNDTABLES, Nov. 16, 2001, and Jan. 24, 2002; Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, 49 D.C. Reg. 10012,
(Nov. 8, 2002). See also COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 14-373, THE OMNIBUS ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2002 (Apr. 4, 2002).
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The Office for National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) within the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security was created to "oversee and coordinate
Federal programs for and relationships with state, local, and regional authorities
in the National Capital Region."'

4

Issuance of this report is timed to be available

as that office creates its regional plan for the National Capital area.
In addition to extensive legislative and legal research, the project team interviewed staff and discussed this report with a wide array of public and private
officials, including those in: the Office of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton; the office of the City Administrator of the District of Columbia; the office of
the District's Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice; the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department; the D.C. Fire Department; District Department of Transportation (D. DoT); the D.C. Emergency Management Agency (EMA); the Office
of National Capital Region Coordination of the Homeland Security Department

(ONCRC); the Capitol Police; the Council of the District of Columbia; and business and civic leaders in the District.
IV.
A.

BACKGROUND

Historical Summary

Increased security around government facilities has occurred throughout the
nation over the last decade in response to security threats. But the restrictions
undertaken by federal agencies in the District have had more lasting effects than
in other cities because the sheer number and size of federal offices in the District

make provision of security for these buildings far more likely to cause spillover
effects on surrounding commercial and residential neighborhoods. 5 The situation in the District is further complicated by its unique governmental structure.
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress possesses plenary authority over District
affairs, and the federal government thus asserts greater control over areas around

federal buildings in the District than it does in other jurisdictions.' 6
14 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 882, 116 Stat. 2135, 2246.
15 Many federal and District agencies and entities have their own police forces. See Hearing
before the Subcomm. on the Dist. of Columbia of the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 1-4 (Sept.
20, 2002) (statement of George Vandenburg); see App. B.
16 See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl.
17 ("Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession
of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United
States ....); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co:, 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) ("[C]ongress'
power over the District of Columbia encompasses the full authority of the government, and thus,
necessarily, the Executive and Judicial powers as well as the Legislative."). Unlike other provisions of
the federal Constitution, the District Clause also provides general police power authority. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) ("[C]ongress may .. .exercise all the police and
regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for
state or local purposes."); District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953)
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According to the Home Rule Act 1 7-and consistent with prior delegations of
authority by Congress-the District government has "exclusive jurisdiction" over
most of the local streets and highways within the District.1 8 After over one hundred years of controlling the city's streets and highways, the District government
has developed several entities designed to evaluate the necessity of closures and

restrictions and the ramifications of such actions. The District also maintains an
agency, the sole task of which is responding to local emergencies.1 9 A comprehensive regulatory scheme for both temporary and permanent restrictions on
street use governs the areas under municipal jurisdiction. 20 This complex regulatory scheme is well-designed to protect the rights of property owners, but was not
developed with a view toward security-justified constraints.
("The power of Congress over the District of Columbia relates ... to all the powers of legislation
which may be exercised by a state in dealing with its affairs.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
17 The first section of the Home Rule Act states that:
[s]ubject to the retention by Congress of the ultimate legislative authority over the Nation's
Capital granted by article I, section 8, of the Constitution, the intent of Congress is to delegate certain legislative powers to the government of the District of Columbia; authorize the
election of certain local officials by the registered qualified electors in the District of Columbia; grant to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers of local self-government; to
modernize, reorganize, and otherwise improve the governmental structure of the District of
Columbia; and, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the constitutional mandate,
relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters.
Home Rule Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 102, 87 Stat. 774, 850 (1973).
18 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 9-101.02 (2001). This provision (which predates Home Rule) specifies that:
The Mayor of the District of Columbia shall have the care and charge of, and the exclusive
jurisdiction over, all the public roads and bridges, except such as belong to and are under the
care of the United States, and except such as may be otherwise specially provided for by
Congress.
19 See App. A.
20 In the D.C. Alley Closing and Acquisition Procedures Act of 1982, specifying how to permanently close a street, D.C. CODE ANN. § 9-202.01-14 (2001), Congress reworked a 1932 statute that
had been enacted (statement of Rep. Black) because Congress tired of having to make what Congress
characterized as purely municipal decisions about whether or not to close a street. See, e.g., 72 CONG.
REC. 287 (1932) ("It is highly absurd that the Congress of the United States, carrying on its shoulders
the weighty problems of the country, should have to pass separate acts every time the District Commissioners require a blind alley to be closed in Washington, or some side street that does not mean
anything.") (quoted in Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Pres. League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 111 (D.D.C.
1984)) [hereinafter "Techworld"]. The District's Historic Preservation Review Board must review
any street or alley closing sought within the boundaries of the L'Enfant Plan. See 24 D.C. MUN.
REGS. § 1402.1. The L'Enfant Plan is generally bounded by Florida Avenue and Benning Road on
the north; the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers to the east and south; and Rock Creek to the west.
Likewise, all street and alley closings within those boundaries are referred to the NCPC unless all
abutting property owners consent to the closure. See id. § 1402.2-5. Regulations restrict the placement of obstructions on public rights-of-way. See id. § 2001.2-3. In addition, the District's EMA
currently administers temporary permits for various events, including those involving street closures,
at http://www.dcema.dc.gov/services/permits/index.shtm.
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Two statutory exceptions limit the general grant to the District of the power to
control its streets: when Congress "specially provide[s]" otherwise, or when the
land both "belong[s] to and [is] under the care of the United States.",21 Congress
has, for example, "specially provided" for federal control over most of the monumental core of the District. The federal government has enhanced power over
the Capitol Grounds, National Park Service land (including Lafayette Park, the

Mall, and the White House Park), and the Supreme Court grounds. 22 Similarly,
the District has no rights over federal land: the Council of the District of Columbia has no authority
to "enact any act ... which concerns the ... property of the
23
States."
United

Several federal entities with exclusive jurisdiction over certain District parcels
are involved in restricting public access. 24 Among the most visible authorities
responsible for the most security-intensive sites within the District are the Secret
Service, the Capitol Police Board, and the National Park Service.25
B.
1.

ProminentRestrictions on Public Access in the District

Closure of Pennsylvania Avenue to Vehicular Traffic

On the morning of Saturday, May 20, 1995, following the Murrah Building
bombing in Oklahoma City, the Secret Service closed Pennsylvania Avenue north
of the White House to all but federally authorized vehicles. 26 This closure was

ordered under authority inferred from the general statutes authorizing the Secret
Service to take certain temporary measures to ensure the security and safety of
21

D.C. Code § 9-101.02 (2004). Determining who has title and "care" may not be straightfor-

ward, in certain cases, at least in areas close to federal buildings or on the borders of the federal
reservations. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Council of the Dist. of Columbia (1995) (statement of the
Office of the Surveyor) (stating that title to all of Pennsylvania Avenue is held in the United States
and that part of it is in Appropriation No. 1, "one of 17 areas appropriated for the use of the United
States Government" according to the King Plats of 1803, and noting that it is not known how and
when the city obtained jurisdiction over this land).
22 See App. A.5.
23 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-206.02(a)(3) (2001). A similar provision in the U.S. Code for streets
under federal ownership prevents local encroachment. 40 U.S.C. § 8121(a)(1) (2004) (authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to prevent the "improper appropriation or occupation" of any public street
or reservation within the District of Columbia that "belongs to the federal Government").
24 Numerous federal reservations exist within the boundaries of the District, including, for instance, the St. Elizabeths campus, and the land on which many federal agencies are placed. They are
not considered in any further detail here. See generally 40 U.S.C. chs. 61-81 (2004) (detailing provisions governing other federal buildings and parks within the District).
25 These entities-and additional relevant federal agencies-are described in detail in App. A.
26 For more on the specific circumstances of the Pennsylvania Avenue closing, see, e.g., DeNeen
L. Brown & Saundra Torry, D.C. Anxious About Impact of PennsylvaniaAve. Closing; Officials Ponder Cost to City, Businesses, Commuters, WASH. POST, May 22, 1995, at Al.
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the President, his family, and staff.2 7 Closure of Pennsylvania Avenue was car-

ried out as a temporary emergency measure on the basis of an internal (and still
partly classified) security review that concluded that no other measure could adequately protect the White House from the risk of truck bombs. 2 8 Rules promul-

gated following the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue suggest that the restrictions
are permanent and have effectively displaced the original announcement of the
closure as a short-term emergency measure. 2 9 The Secret Service has not publicly wavered from the position that Pennsylvania Avenue should remain closed

indefinitely.
Various attempts have been made to reopen the street to vehicular traffic and,

for a time, the closure remained quite controversial-even within Congress. For
example, most recently, on March 21, 2001, hearings on the effect of the Avenue's closure on both the District and the region were held by Congresswoman
Morella before the District of Columbia Subcommittee of the House Govern-

ment Reform Committee. 30 A resolution urging the reopening of Pennsylvania
Avenue was ordered to be reported out of Committee later in 2001. 3 1 In addition, local officials sent letters to the Bush Administration requesting that Penn-

sylvania Avenue be reopened. No similar efforts, however, were made after
September 11th.
27 The closure of Pennsylvania Avenue was initially effected by Treasury Order 170-09, Off.
Mem. 170-09 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter, "Mem. Op."], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc
pennsopn.htm, issued the day the street was closed, and was justified by the Justice Department,
providing analysis of the legal authority for the temporary closing of Pennsylvania Avenue north of
the White House and noting that, because it was an emergency measure, other statutory provisions,
such as the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2004), could be ignored. The
Mem. Op. concludes that because the Home Rule Act prohibits the District government from enacting legislation concerning the functions or property of the United States, see District of Columbia
Self-Government and Government Reorganization (Home Rule) Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 602, 87
Stat. 774, 894-5 (1973), the District government lacked power to interfere with the Secret Service's
efforts to protect the President. See Mem. Op. at 11. However, it was Congress and not the District
government that transferred control over District streets to the District, so it is not the District alone
seeking to control Pennsylvania Avenue; it is the District acting under the express authority of Congress. See An Act for the Government of the District of Columbia and for Other Purposes, ch. 337,
§ 2, 18 Stat. 166 (1874). The Mem. Op. cites Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Pres. League, 648 F. Supp.
106, 111 (D.D.C. 1986), see supra note 14, for the proposition that Treasury Department statutes
essentially trump that express congressional grant to the District of the power over District streets.
See Mem. Op. at 6-7. In Techworld, however, it was the District and not the federal government that
was seeking to close a street, so the Opinion's reliance on Techworld is inappropriate.
28 The security review's recommendation was initially rejected by the Clinton Administration
and put in place only several weeks after the Oklahoma City bombing. See RAND Report, supra
note 9, at 16.
29 See 31 C.F.R. § 413.1(a)(2004) (closing the 1600 block of State Place, and South Executive
Avenue to all non-official vehicular traffic).
30 See Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Dist. of Columbia, Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001).
31 See H.R. Res. 125, 107th Cong. (2001).
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In October 2002, the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) released
The National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, a result of "close collaboration among the federal and District of Columbia governments, the professional
planning and design community, security agencies, and civic, business, and community groups., 32 Among other things, that plan recommended that Pennsylvania Avenue north of the White House remain closed to vehicular traffic
(except for a proposed shuttle bus system, or "circulator," which would allow
tourists, residents, and federal workers to navigate the closed area), that new
pedestrian-oriented public space be created, and that feasibility studies of a possible tunnel under Pennsylvania Avenue or E Street be conducted.33 On March 12,
2003, the NCPC approved a concept design for Pennsylvania Avenue north of the
White House that incorporated the recommendations in the October 2002 plan,
but that also required that the pedestrian orientation to the development be reversible. 34 That plan was formally approved by the NCPC in September 2003.
President Bush's FY 2004 proposed budget included $15 million for the construction of improvements to Pennsylvania Avenue.
2.

Proliferation of Barriers

After the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, federal and other governmental
buildings across the nation sought to reduce the risk of damage from similar attacks. In the District, a variety of physical barriers now surround the perimeter
and block the entranceways of various federal as well as local and non-governmental buildings. These barriers include Jersey barriers, bollards, Delta barriers
(also known as Nasatka barriers) which pop up from the ground, and temporary
planters (many sprouting nothing more than weeds and grass).3 6 These various
barriers are not only unsightly; they are also potentially hazardous to pedestrians
and drivers.
3.

Increase of Security Perimeters Following September l1th

After September 11, 2001, the number of traffic, parking, and pedestrian restrictions around federal installations increased dramatically, not just in the District but nationwide. The post-September 11th restrictions on access and traffic
imposed by the Secret Service around the White House Park (which remains
32

NCPC URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN, supra note 11, at 1.

33 See id. at 19-21.
34 See Press Release, NCPC Commission Unanimously Approves Concept Design for Pennsylvania Avenue in Front of the White House; Plan Will Create a Welcoming and Beautiful Main
Street for America (Mar.12, 2003), available at http://www.ncpc.gov/publications/PressReleases/2003/
pr031203.html.
35 See Office of Management and Budget, District of Columbia, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/agencies.html.
36

See generally NCPC URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN, supra note 11.
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under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service) were not subjected to the
evaluation and scrutiny that accompanied the earlier closure of Pennsylvania Avenue to vehicles. Further, regulations have not been promulgated to address the
new and proliferating restrictions around the White House.
4.

History of Restrictions Around the White House

Until World War II, the White House grounds were largely open to the public,
albeit heavily patrolled-even during most of the Civil War. In 1983, following
the terrorist attacks in Beirut on the Marine barracks; the Reagan administration
requested a plan for alternative uses of Pennsylvania Avenue. (A similar plan
had been proposed during the Kennedy Administration as a beautification rather
than security measure.) The Reagan-era plan by architect Carl Warnecke-the
same person who had proposed the earlier measure to President Kennedy and
who designed many of the improvements to Lafayette Park in the 1960s and
1970s-suggested construction of a tunnel under the Avenue and the development of a pedestrian plaza. This plan was not implemented; instead, the Secret
Service tightened access to the White House for visitors and media, and installed
concrete bollards on the sidewalk immediately north of the White House fence.
Between 1983 and the closure of the Avenue in 1995, additional barriers, security
stations, and electronic sensors were installed.37
The recent restrictions around the White House authorized by the Secret Service have been substantial. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the Secret
Service ordered the reclosure of E Street-a significant east-west thoroughfaresouth of the White House, and it has remained closed ever since. 38 The sidewalk
in front of the White House South Lawn is now occasionally placed off limits to
pedestrians, and tourists are not always allowed to walk up to the lawn railings to
view the White House. Truck traffic on eight blocks of 17th Street 39 west of the
White House (from Pennsylvania Avenue to Constitution Avenue) was banned
by the Secret Service in August 2002. 40 In addition, following a request first
made by the Secret Service in September of 2001, the Park Service has denied all
requests for large demonstrations or special events in Lafayette Park, the Ellipse,
and on the sidewalks north of the White House. This ban on large demonstrations in Lafayette Park, renewed on a monthly basis, remains in effect. 41 In addi37 For a more detailed summary of the history of security measures around the White House,
see RAND Report, supra note 9, at 8-17.
38 That stretch of E Street was closed following the Oklahoma City bombing, but reopened on
November 21, 2000, after adjustments to the street flow were completed.
39 17th Street is an important north-south artery that provides access to Virginia.
40 See Spencer S. Hsu, Penn. Ave. Security Prompts Truck Ban; Change Affects 8 Blocks Near
the White House, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at B1.
41 See Letter from U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Nat'l Park Service (May 28, 2003) (extending
"partial and temporary public use limitation" on "large" demonstrations and special events for Lafay-
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tion, the Secret Service now readjusts the "perimeter" around the White House
in response to issuance of Homeland Security alerts. 4 2 These "temporary" re-

strictions on access around the White House complex issued by the Department
of Homeland Security have been announced through routine press releases that
provide no legal justification.
5. Capitol Area Restrictions
Following September 11th, a number of streets under the jurisdiction of the
Capitol Police Board were closed.4 3 Except for Constitution and Independence
Avenues, the streets immediately bordering the Senate and House Office Buildings are now closed to vehicular traffic; several appear to be closed permanently.

Truck traffic not related to the construction of the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC)
has been restricted around and diverted from the Capitol Complex. Pop-up
Delta barriers that can be activated to block traffic were installed at Independence Avenue on the south side of the Capitol and are being installed at Consti-

tution Avenue north of the Capitol. More significant changes and restrictions on
access, including the permanent closure of Independence and Constitution Avenues to traffic,44 further extending the security perimeter for the Capitol Police,
and closing the streets adjacent to the Supreme Court to all but local traffic, have
been proposed but not yet implemented, partly as a result of local and Congressional opposition.4 5
ette Park in response to the Secret Service's latest monthly request since September 24, 2001); see also
Mahoney v. Norton, Civ No. 02-1715 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2001) (discussing the NPS policy to limit all
demonstrations to groups of less than 25 persons).
42 See Press Release, U.S. Secret Service (Mar. 18, 2003) (announcing "adjustments" to the
perimeter of the White House, closing Pennsylvania Avenue to pedestrian traffic, on the eve of Operation Traffic Freedom), availableat http://www.secretservice.gov/press/pub1103.pdf; see Press Release,
U.S. Secret Service (May 7, 2003) (announcing reopening of these areas to pedestrian traffic), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/press/publ603.pdf.
43 The Capitol Police Board is composed of the Senate Sergeant at Arms (SSaA), the Architect
of the Capitol (AoC), and the House Sergeant at Arms (HSaA). See 2 U.S.C. § 1969(a) (2004).
Under this authority, the Board has promulgated Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations for the U.S.
Capitol Grounds, which were most recently revised in 1983. See id. at § 1969(b). The Mayor of the
District of Columbia is required to "cooperate" in the preparation of these regulations. See id.
§ 1969(c). The AoC is more generally responsible for the maintenance, operation, development, and
preservation of the United States Capitol Complex, which includes the Capitol, the congressional
office buildings, the Library of Congress buildings, the Supreme Court building, the U.S. Botanical
Garden, the Capitol Power Plant, and other facilities, available at http://www.aoc.gov/AOC/
aocoverview.htm.
44

See Spenser S. Hsu, High Court Asks for 2 Street Closings; Security ProposalIrks D.C. Offi-

cials, WASH. POST, May 25, 2002, at B1.

45

See id.
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C. Regional Emergency Taskforces
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, several regional taskforces have worked
to smooth the interjurisdictional problems involved in regional coordination of
emergency response. These temporary working groups were convened at approximately the same time as the District created its District Emergency Response Plan.46 These regional groups were designed to ensure that localities
could better coordinate and prevent a repeat of the confusion that occurred immediately following the September 11th attacks. These groups, however, have
focused either on implementing emergency response coordination following a
catastrophic event or on promulgating regional evacuation and traffic management plans. The groups have not focused on evaluating the specifics or impacts
individual mid- or long-term security restriction or protection
of any particular
47
strategy.
1. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (CoG) Emergency
Response Plan
Shortly after September 11, 2001, CoG created a Taskforce on Homeland Security and Emergency Response for the National Capital Area. This taskforce
worked on creating a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, a structure
through which local, state, federal, and private sector partners may coordinate
their response to regional incidents and emergencies. 48 The CoG taskforce also
developed a Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System
("RICCS") to enhance communications among local officials in the event of a
regional emergency.
2.

The Greater Washington Board of Trade (GWBoT) Regional Preparedness
and Recovery Taskforce

Similarly, in November 2001, the Potomac Conference of the GWBoT established a Regional Preparedness and Recovery Taskforce. That taskforce was directed to participate in and complement the work underway at CoG and to assist
private businesses in the region with the development of their own emergency
preparedness plans.
46 See App. B.
47 See paragraphs 1-3 below. Conversely, the NCPC has considered the aesthetic long-term
effects of temporary security restrictions.
48 These responsibilities were given to the National Capital Region Emergency Preparedness
Council on November 13, 2002, a more permanent part of the CoG structure that replaced the earlier
ad hoc committee.
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3.

The August 5, 2002 Homeland Security Summit

One of the first attempts to further integrate the federal government into these
regional initiatives appears to have been the National Capital Region Summit on
Homeland Security held on August 5, 2002. At that meeting, chaired by Tom
Ridge (then the Director of the White House's Office of Homeland Security),
representatives of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia signed an
eight-point "Commitments to Action" which committed their governments to improve regional coordination during emergencies in partnership with the Homeland Security Office. 49 Responsibility for furthering the agenda agreed to by the
Commitments to Action has now moved to ONCRC. The August 5, 2002, summit (and the perceived need for sustained federal involvement) was part of the
impetus for the creation of the ONCRC to coordinate regional emergency
preparation.
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

The District Government Is Well Suited to Assess and Implement Traffic
and Other Restrictions in the District of Columbia

It is in the best interests of the federal government to work closely with the
District government in implementing street closures and traffic restrictions. As a
historical matter, in 1932 Congress delegated to the District authority over the
local streets to relieve itself of the "absurd" responsibility of having to address
these types of routine matters legislatively.5 0 In passing the Home Rule Act in
1973, Congress further ceded to the District powers over other "essentially local"
matters and recognized the District government's superior ability to exercise
traditional municipal powers. 5 1 As a practical matter, since receiving and long
exercising this authority, the District, like all other local governments, has developed an expertise in providing municipal services. The District employs persons
of particular experience and qualification. It has established an infrastructure
designed to deliver these services. And, perhaps most importantly, for local issues, the District's government of locally elected representatives is more likely to
respond to the needs of its citizenry and other relevant constituencies than are
federal government agencies.
This is especially true in the area of traffic management. 52 Actions taken by
entities of the federal government to close streets or make other traffic restric49 Eight "Commitments to Action" were agreed to by the three jurisdictions on the following
subjects: (1) Citizen Involvement in Preparedness; (2) Decision-Making and Coordination; (3) Emergency Protective Measures; (4) Infrastructure Protection; (5) Media Relations and Communication;
(6) Mutual Aid; (7) Terrorism Prevention; and (8) Training and Exercises.
50 See supra Section IV.A and supra note 20.
51 See supra Section IV.A and supra note 17.
52

See supra Section IV.A.
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tions have tangible and intangible consequences. Such actions will almost certainly disrupt customary traffic patterns in areas far removed from the area in
which the action was taken or, as mentioned earlier, even hinder the ability of the
District to provide emergency services in a timely manner. For example, the 1995
closing of Pennsylvania Avenue north of the White House forced Metro to re3
route twenty-five bus lines at an estimated annual cost of $314,000.5
Traffic flow within the District, or within any city, depends on capacity and
alternate routes (sometimes called "redundancy"). Closing major thoroughfares
reduces street capacity and redundancy and thereby reduces the efficiency and
safety of the public. The fewer choices the public has to avoid or escape emergencies, the greater the risk that an emergency will cause harm. Furthermore,
increased auto emissions from more idling vehicles stuck in traffic has raised carbon monoxide levels in the city and increased EPA compliance concerns for the
District. 54 Because District officials deal with such issues on a daily basis,5 5 they
have developed the expertise necessary to assess the risks of certain changes to
traffic movements and to make alternative recommendations.
Regardless of the exact consequences of any given restriction, the District's
experience and expertise in this area-as well as the District's crucial stake in the
issue-make it important that the District be involved in the decision-making
process with federal entities to identify those consequences, assess their likely
impact, and design an implementation plan that minimizes that impact. When
national security considerations require restrictions on local traffic or other local
access, the local government is well suited to help design and implement such
restrictions in the least disruptive way. The local government is also able to provide expertise that could avoid the imposition of unnecessarily disruptive or ineffective restrictions. District officials will also have insight into alternative modes
of implementation.
An important successful example of this cooperation between the federal and
District governments is the Capitol Police's response to security threats to the
Capitol Building and neighboring House and Senate Office Buildings following
the events of September 11, 2001. The first post-September 11th security proposals the Capitol Police put forward involved closing both Constitution and Independence Avenues north and south of the Capitol to all public vehicular traffic.
In consultation with a joint District-federal taskforce, however, the Capitol Police
instead agreed that, through the use of an array of devices in coordination with
the District's traffic monitoring programs, suspicious trucks and other vehicles
53 See Paul Bedard, Closing Costs Won't Open Avenue, Traffic, Pollution Rise as District's Loss
Nears $1 Million, WASH. TIMES, May 3, 1997, at Al.
54 See id.; see also Emergency Preparednessin the Nation's Capital: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Dist. of Columbia, Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Mayor
Anthony Williams).
55 See generally App. B.
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could be identified, tracked, told to stop, and when necessary intercepted and
stopped a safe distance from potential targets. The result, according to District
transportation officials, is that major thoroughfares on Capitol Hill have remained open to drivers and the Capitol Police have achieved the level of security
they sought.
The principal objection federal entities appear to have to an arrangement in
which the federal government consults and cooperates with the District is that
national security priorities could be hindered. However, as shown on Capitol
Hill, with real and substantive cooperation and consultation on negotiating street
closures and other traffic restrictions, such priorities can be maintained, if not
enhanced, even when consultation with District officials leads to a proposed restriction not being implemented at the time or in the manner originally envisioned. Security measures around federal buildings and monuments can be made
in such a way that they improve the overall security of the District itself to the
benefit of its residents and commuters, many of whom work in or near these
buildings, and of its visitors, who frequent the District's monuments. Accordingly, by coordinating with the District in advance and allowing the District to
participate in the implementation of the chosen action, the concerns of all affected parties can be considered and, to the extent possible, efficiently accommodated. In other words, balance between security and access can be achieved.
B. The Federal Presence Imposes Costs on the District, and Those Costs
Should Be Minimized Through InterjurisdictionalCooperation or Compensation

The District of Columbia, as the seat of the federal government, incurs significant costs not experienced by other municipalities of comparable size and population. Some of these costs result from the increased need for security at various
special events, demonstrations, and protests, both planned and unplanned, for
which the nation's capital is often the preferred venue. In a report recently issued to Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the demands placed upon the District by the federal presence limit the District's ability
to provide adequate public safety services.56 Recognizing the additional costs of
the federal presence, the U.S. government has, in many instances, provided compensation to the District.5 7 In the Appropriations Acts for the District for the
past three fiscal years, Congress appropriated $11 million (FY 2004), $15 million
56

See 2003 GAO,

No. GAO-03-666, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: STRUCTURAL IMBAL63 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
57 For instance, federal officials initially stated that the federal government would compensate
the District for the costs of the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue. See Deneen L. Brown & Saundra
Torry, D.C. Anxious About Impact of Pennsylvania Ave. Closing; Officials Ponder Cost to City Businesses, Commuters, WASH. POST, May 22, 1995, at A16 (quoting Ronald K. Noble, Undersecretary for
Enforcement at the Treasury Department). In the environmental assessment released in 1997, the
Treasury estimated the cost of the closure at $412,000. See Stephen C. Fehr, Report on Pennsylvania
REPORT

ANCE AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES,
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(FY 2003) and approximately $16 million (FY 2002) to a general fund used to
reimburse the District for expenses necessary for the provision of security "due to
the fact that the District of Columbia is the seat of the Federal Government and
headquarters of many international organizations. "58
With respect to specific events, approximately $3.4 million of the District's FY
2002 appropriations amount was earmarked to reimburse the District for expenses incurred to provide security for the planned September 2001 meetings of

the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Likewise, Congress also appropriated $6 million and $5.7 million respectively to reimburse the
District for expenses
incurred in connection with the 2001 and 1997 presidential
59
inaugurations.

The federal government has, therefore, shown a willingness to provide some
level of compensation when the costs imposed by the federal presence take the
form of readily quantifiable costs borne by the District.60 However, the GAO
reports that the compensation typically provided by Congress fails to fully reimburse the actual costs sustained by the District. 61 Traditionally, Congress has not

compensated the District for costs imposed by other activities of the federal government-for example, road closures and other traffic restrictions-for which
costs are more difficult to quantify. 62 The difficulty of quantification should not,
however, preclude the federal government from assessing these costs and imple-

menting closures and restrictions in ways that minimize costs as much as possible.
Avenue Closing Hits a Dead End, WASH. POST, June 3, 1997, at BI. To our knowledge, no direct
compensation for this closure has been paid.
58 Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 111 (2004); S. Rep. 107-225 to Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11
(2002); District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-96, 115 Stat. 923 (2001).
59 See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub.
L. No. 107-96, 115 Stat. 923 (2001); Pub. L. No. 106-522, 114 Stat. 2440 (2000); Pub. L. No. 104-194,
110 Stat. 2356 (1996).
60 See NCPC PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TRAFFIC ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS, supra note 9; see
also generally NCPC URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN, supra note 11.
61 See GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 70.
62 The closures of sections of Pennsylvania Avenue and E Street in the vicinity of the White
House were thoroughly studied by the NCPC as part of its October 2001 report suggesting modifications and improvements in this historic area. The NCPC's Interagency Task Force highlighted the
severe disruptions the road closures have had on traffic patterns in the downtown area, which have
strained the downtown economy and potentially slowed economic development. Although, as noted,
the exact costs arising from these road closures are difficult to quantify, the NCPC estimates the costs
of proposed alternatives (east-west tunnels of varying lengths and locations) designed to restore preclosure traffic patterns to be between $55 and $135 million. Notably, the Task Force found a need for
at least one of these alternatives in order to sustain the downtown area's long-term growth and vitality. These estimates far exceed the $11 million appropriated in FY 2004 for improvements to the
area, and it is not clear whether this allocation may lawfully be used in the construction of one of the
alternatives discussed by the NCPC. The NCPC report does not identify which entity-the District or
the federal government-would be expected to bear the cost (or the excess cost) of constructing the
alternative. See NCPC PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TRAFFIC ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS, supra note 9.
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Rather, in evaluating whether a road closure or traffic restriction is justified by a
legitimate security interest, it would be more effective for the federal government
to include appropriate District officials in those discussions at the outset, and,
should the road closure or traffic restriction be deemed appropriate, to employ
District procedures, infrastructure, and personnel in its implementation. As discussed above, District officials are better situated to assess the likely impact of a

course of action and, acting in the District's interest, would therefore be better
able to minimize the financial impact imposed on the local infrastructure.
Furthermore, taking action without discussion with the District regarding the
costs imposed by certain proposed actions and ways to minimize those costs will
put the District in the difficult position of needing to quantify those costs afterthe-fact. 63 It is well established, of course, that when unilateral federal action
affects property owned by the District, the federal government may also have a
legal duty to provide compensation. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applies when the federal government "takes"
property belonging to a state or municipality. 64 Whether a road closure or traffic

restriction would amount to a taking is a complex and fact-specific inquiry. But
intergovernmental takings law makes clear that the federal government may have

a duty to compensate the District for the costs imposed by unilateral federal action, especially if these actions are tantamount to a physical condemnation of
District property. 65 Of course, were the federal government to achieve its desired course of action through consensual negotiation, the District would effec63 Costs associated with removing metered parking spaces, however, are not difficult to quantify. The Washington Times reports that the District estimated in 1995 that lost parking meter revenue
from Pennsylvania Avenue could reach $752,000 a year, for example. See Brian Bloomquist, D.C.
Ponders Closure Battle, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at C4.
64 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984) ("When the United States
condemns a local public facility, the loss to the public entity, to the persons served by it, and to the
local taxpayers may be no less acute than the loss in a taking of private property. Therefore, it is most
reasonable to construe the reference to 'private property' in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local governments when it is condemned by the
United States.").
65 When the federal government takes public roads, courts have held that compensation should
be measured not by the fair market value of the property taken, but by the cost of providing a substitute. See United States v. City of New York, 168 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Des
Moines County, 148 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir. 1945); see also United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441
U.S. 506, 513 (1979) ("The instances in which market value is too difficult to ascertain generally
involve property of a type so infrequently traded that we cannot predict whether the prices previously
paid, assuming there have been prior sales,.would be repeated in a sale of the condemned property
(citation omitted). This might be the case, for example, with respect to public facilities such as roads
or sewers." (emphasis supplied)). This may be of particular importance to the District given the
NCPC's assessment of the projected costs for the proposed alternatives for the Pennsylvania Avenue
and E Street routes. But note that "substitution costs" are only appropriate when a substitute is
"reasonably necessary." See United States v. Sts., Alleys & Pub. Ways, 531 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir.
1976); Wash. v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 44 (9th Cir. 1954).
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tively be adopting the course of action as its own, thus obviating or undercutting
any potential takings claim; equitable compensation would thus be left to the
parties to determine, rather than for a court. This rationale provides yet another
reason for the federal government to work closely with the District in adopting
and implementing national security-related restrictions.
In fact, given that in the present circumstances numerous federal agencies impose national security-related restrictions on the District without ever coordinating with other federal agencies-or with the District itself-such restrictions are
not the result of a careful balancing of the perceived national security gain
against the possible disruption, costs, and safety concerns raised by the restriction. If such a balance were struck, and the input from District officials timely
sought, it seems quite likely that some of the restrictions would not be imposed at
all, and others would be imposed in a far more efficient fashion.66
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

DC Appleseed recommends the following:
A. Formalize and Clarify in a Public Agreement the Complex Web of
InterjurisdictionalAgreements Related to Security Street Closures and
Traffic Restrictions
As this report shows, no clear understanding currently exists as to how security-related street closings and other restrictions on public access should be imposed in the District of Columbia. All affected parties would benefit from such
an understanding. Because of the significant consequences that street closings,
traffic restrictions, and related actions impose on the District of Columbia and
surrounding jurisdictions, and because of the constructive role the District government could play in such actions, the relationship between the District, federal
agencies, and surrounding jurisdictions on security-related street closures and
traffic restrictions should take the form of a published agreement. The agreement itself should provide for flexibility and allow quick and decisive action
under emergency circumstances, and public disclosure of the agreement should
not compromise public safety or security.
B. Establish a Joint Federal-DistrictGroup to Evaluate Security Concerns and
Weigh the Costs of Diminishing Freedom, Access, Mobility, and Convenience
Before such an agreement can be formalized, a mutually agreeable mechanism
must be established that satisfies federal agencies that federal personnel, build66 For example, District officials have pointed to lanes of traffic adjacent to federal buildings,
which had been open to traffic prior to September 11, 2001, that are now used as parking areas for
federal employees. Federal officials have benefited from the convenience of this type of closing; but,
as a result, mobility in the District has been hindered.
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ings, and assets are properly protected while also recognizing that the District has
a proper role and legitimate stake in any traffic or parking issues on District
streets. Underlying any such agreement must be a frank discussion about the
rationale for and short- and long-term costs of undertaking security-related traffic
and parking restrictions and road closures. These costs are not merely financial-they include potential public safety concerns, as well as such fundamental
quality of life issues as loss of freedom, access and mobility, deteriorating air
quality, and general inconvenience.
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton has introduced a bill in Congress,
H.R. 1365, to establish the "United States Committee on an Open Society and
Security," which would formally establish a federal panel to evaluate the costs of
closing roads and restricting traffic and parking.67 The panel would consist of
twenty-one members drawn from a number of professions and its deliberations
would be open and designed to encompass a broad range of opinions and viewpoints. Congresswoman Norton's proposal focused on all federal installations
nationwide.
A similar panel with a narrower mandate would surely facilitate the type of
discussion that should precede any proposed security-related traffic restriction in
the District. Such a panel could be a stand-alone entity or could be formed as a
committee of an already established organization such as the joint federal-local
NCPC. The panel should comprise national security experts, representatives
from local community and business groups, District government officials, and
representatives of relevant federal agencies and offices. Such a panel would,
among other things, assess the threat level for each potential target, identify and
ascertain costs of actions, then formulate an appropriate security response to that
threat, taking cost and other negative impacts into consideration. The panel
could look into the appropriateness of security-related street closures and traffic
restrictions imposed prior to the panel's formation. Such a panel could also analyze how traffic restrictions intended to secure federal installations could affect
the movement and possible evacuation of other people in other public or private
buildings in the District.
C.

Establish a Mechanism that Allows Temporary Emergency Street Closings
but Requires Pre-Approval for PermanentStreet Closings

Even within a framework of discussion and evaluation, quick action may be
needed. In emergencies, federal agencies may need to act on very short notice
and with minimal advance discussion. A protocol must be established by the
67 The function of such a Commission would be to "study and make findings and recommendations relating to the question of how the Government of the United States may, in a balanced manner,
provide for both security and public access to Federal buildings and spaces." Proposed H.R. 1365,
107th Cong. 4 (2003).
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panel described above, or one similar to it, that outlines the parameters of what a
federal agency or entity may do with regard to traffic and parking restrictions on
an emergency basis; requires periodic reevaluations to determine how long such
restrictions may last or how they should be adjusted; and provides a formula for

determining appropriate compensation to the District during the period the
emergency action is in place.
In addition, a plan should be put in place to handle permanent traffic restric-

tions. To the extent possible, the public should participate in developing such a
plan and their contributions should be given great weight in the established deliberative process.
VII.

CONCLUSION

National security concerns often require disruption of normal traffic flow in
the District of Columbia. The District government should be involved in decisions affecting those disruptions because it can be a positive force in coordinating
with agencies to minimize the disruptive effects and maximize the effectiveness of
those decisions. A formal agreement setting out that involvement and participation should be promptly developed. Balance between total security and openness, although elusive, is achievable. For that balance to be achieved, however,
the District government must be a part of the decision-making process. A collaborative, well-coordinated process would maximize safety, minimize disruption,
and ensure effective response to any future perceived or real security threat.
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VIII.
A.
1.

APPENDIX

Key Relevant Federal Entities

Office of National Capital Region Coordination, the Homeland Security
Department (ONCRC)

Partly in response to concerns about the lack of involvement of the federal
government in regional security response, Senator Sarbanes of Maryland-with
the support of Congresswoman Norton, who had sought to have a similar amendment introduced in the House-introduced an amendment to the Homeland Security Act to create an Office of National Capital Region Coordination
(ONCRC) as a "single Federal point of contact" within the Department of
Homeland Security that would, it was hoped, "become the vehicle used by the
multitude of Federal entities in the area to receive vital information and input
from the state, local, and regional level in the development of the Federal Government's planning efforts.", 68 The final Act created ONCRC to "oversee and
coordinate Federal programs for and relationships with state, local, and regional
69
authorities in the National Capital Region."
Michael F. Byrne, a former New York City firefighter and a previous Director
within the earlier established Homeland Security Office, was appointed the first
Director of National Capital Region Coordination for Emergency Response for
the Department of Homeland Security by Secretary Tom Ridge on March 9,
2002. In written testimony presented to the House Government Reform Committee on April 10, 2002, Director Byrne stated that a joint federal committee
drawn from all three branches of government to coordinate federal workforce
protection and other regional efforts was currently working with state and local
law enforcement, emergency management, and transportation agencies to develop practical protocols for security-related street closures.7 ° More recently,
Mr. Byrne has been active in dispensing Homeland Security grant monies to re-

68 Press Release of Senator Sarbanes, Homeland Security Bill, Establishment of a New Capital
Regional Office within New Department (Nov. 20, 2002), available at http://sarbanes.senate.gov/
pages/press/1 12002_homeland-securitypass.html.
69 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 882, 116 Stat. 2135.
70
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Dist. of Columbia of the Comm. on Gov't Reform,
107th Cong. (2003). Most of this hearing focused on the so-called "Tractorman" incident, in which a
frustrated tobacco farmer drove his tractor onto the National Mall and threatened to blow himself up.
The hearing also included a warning by Committee Chairman Tom Davis that regional traffic management should be "federalized," availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52572003Aprl0.html.

BALANCING SECURITY AND ACCESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

205

gional governments. 7 1 Mr. Byrne recently resigned as Director and the position
is currently vacant.72
2.

The Secret Service

Recently transferred to the Department of Homeland Security and owing its
origins to efforts to fight counterfeiters in the 19th Century, the Secret Service's
primary function is to protect the President of the United States. Under its general statutes, the Secret Service has broad authority to protect both the President
and the White House itself from potential security threats.7 3 In addition to its
other functions, the Secret Service also participates in the planning, coordination,
and implementation of security operations at special events of national significance, when authorized to do so by the President.74 The scope of the Secret
Service's authority to effect temporary security restrictions has not been resolved
by any court.
3.

The Capitol Police Board

The Capitol Police Board has exclusive control over all traffic within the 276
acres of Capitol Hill controlled by the Architect of the Capitol, where the boundary between municipal and congressional control appears one of tradition rather
than logic. 75 For some of the streets within this area, however, including the important artery of Constitution Avenue, the District maintains control for "maintenance and improvement. '76 As noted earlier, after September 11th, most of
the streets within the Police Board's jurisdiction that had not previously been
restricted were closed to unauthorized vehicles. Those streets under the Police
Board's exclusive control and not subject to the partial authority of the District
have been closed off semi-permanently by newly constructed planters and security stations.
Coordination between Congress and the District in implementing security
measures around the Capitol, however, has increased. At a September 20, 2002,
hearing on Coordination of Emergency Response in the Metropolitan Area, held
before the District Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee,
Terrance W. Gainer, Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police, acknowledged that street
71

See R. H. Melton, Region's Security Boosted by $75 Million; Federal Funds Going To First

Responders, WASH.
72

POST,

June 6, 2003, at B1.

See The Region: Homeland Security Regional Chief Leaving, WASH.

POST,

Nov. 19, 2003, at

B3.
73 The relevant statutes are 3 U.S.C. § 202 (2004) and 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (2004) ("Treasury Department Statutes"), both of which broadly grant authority to protect the President, but offer few
specifics as to the limits of that authority.
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(e)(2004).
75 See 40 U.S.C. § 5102(b)(2004).
76 See 40 U.S.C. § 5102(b)(2)(A)(2004).
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closures can adversely affect the city and outlined for the Congress the procedures by which the Capitol Police now "closely coordinates" with the District and
other agencies when closures and other measures near the Capitol Complex are
required.77 That structure includes an Executive Leadership Steering Committee
composed of officials who meet periodically to coordinate security projects between the Capitol and the District.7 8
4.

The National Park Service
Lafayette Park, the White House Park, the Ellipse, and the Mall all fall under

the control of the National Park Service-as do the sidewalks immediately fronting the White House and various other parks and federal reservations within the
District. The Park Service has had a mixed record in the success of security

rationales as justifications for restrictions on public access; numerous First
Amendment challenges have been made to Park Service regulations that have

sought to restrict public activities by citing security concerns, some of which have
limited the Park Service's authority. 79 The success of the Park Service at justifying regulations restricting public activity on the grounds of security rather than
aesthetic or other grounds has varied depending on the receptivity of the particu80
lar court to governmental arguments about pressing security needs.

5. Supreme Court Grounds
The Supreme Court Grounds include the block on which the Court is situated

and parts of the neighboring block to the east across Second Street, N.E. 81 This
section of Maryland Avenue is also occasionally closed to vehicular traffic. The

Marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Police have jurisdiction
over the Grounds. 82 Although the Architect of the Capitol performs a number of

functions for the Court, the Supreme Court Grounds are statutorily defined separately, as are the grounds for the Library of Congress (LOC).8 3
77 See Emergency Preparednessin the Nation's Capital:Hearings on Coordinationof Emergency
Response in the Metropolitan Area Before the Dist. Subcomm. of the House Gov't Reform Comm.
107th Cong. 17-21 (2002) (statement of Terrance W. Gainer, Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police).
78 See id.
79 National Park Service regulations governing the National Capital Area are currently located
at 36 C.F.R. § 7.96 (2004).
80 See White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding restrictions on materials used in and location of demonstration on the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalk and speaking extensively about the White House's need for security in the face of terrorist
threats); Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (sustaining district court's
rejection of number restrictions on gatherings in Lafayette Park and the White House sidewalk justified in part on concern for the safety and security of the White House).
81 See 40 U.S.C. § 6101(b) (2004).
82 See id. § 6102.
83 See id. § 6101(b).

BALANCING SECURITY AND ACCESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

6.

207

U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)

The GSA handles most property acquisition and rental for the federal government and sets security standards for buildings that the federal government
occupies.
7.

U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)

OPM sets personnel policy for most federal employees and is instrumental to
any security plan involving federal workers.
B.

Key Relevant District Entities

1. D.C. Emergency Management Agency (EMA)
The EMA coordinates the city's response to disasters and emergencies and
works with the Mayor's Special Event Task Group to coordinate special events
within the city. The agency monitors weather conditions, fires, and other emergencies, and oversees special events-including the many marches and demonstrations occurring each year. The EMA works closely with other emergency
response agencies, including the Metropolitan Police Department, the Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, and other District and federal
agencies.
2.

District Department of Transportation (D. DoT)

The D. DoT manages and maintains transportation infrastructure. The Department's jurisdiction 84 includes planning, design, and maintenance of the District's streets, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, traffic signals, and streetlights.

84

available at http://www.ddot.dc.gov/main.shtm.

